

13 MAY 1976

## IC REGISTRY ROUTING SLIP

2-7

Routing	Office	Date	Initials
4	D/DCI/IC	H/S	
3	EA	5/14	MV
2	AD/DCI/IC	5/14	Z
1	EO	5/13	M
STAT	SA [ ]		
	SA [ ]		
	CFI (Sec't)		
	NFIB (Sec't)		
	REGISTRY	13/5	B
5	OPP		
	P&PD		STAT
	THD		
6	SECOM		
	OPBD		
	DSG		
	P&BDD		
	PAD		
	OPEI		STAT
	INTEG STAFF		
	SIGINT DIV.		
	IMAGERY DIV.		
	HRD		
	PA&ID		

Cy furn Office(s) circled)

STAT

Please take for  
action.

FYI

p. 3.1

Ellsworth has responded  
to the DCS's letter which  
expressed concern over  
an independent DOD study  
of unauthorized disclosure.

DOD has back off from  
their original proposal.

[ ] has an  
advance copy of this.

14 May 76

Be sure we

Take all  
responsible  
initiatives to  
stay out in  
front in this  
area.

STAT

~~DDCI~~

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17	H. Knoche		X
8	D/DCI/IC	X		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Progress?!



DCI/DCI

25X1



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Executive Registry
76-2010/1

7 MAY 1976

Honorable George H. Bush  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear George:

This is in response to your letter of 28 April in which you took exception to the proposed Yarmolinsky study. I understand your concern and have taken appropriate action to confine the terms of the study to Department of Defense matters.

As the study progresses, I would enjoy consulting with you from time to time especially if the study reveals items of mutual interest. In any event, I will routinely update you since I realize that this is a problem of concern to all of us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely "Bob", is written in ink above the printed name.

Robert Ellsworth

EB

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

IC STAT

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	S/MC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/IC	X			
9	D/DCI/NIO				
10	GC		X		
11	LC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S		X		
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19	H. Knoche		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

STAT

Executive Secretary

23 Apr 76

Date

3637 (1-75)



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

From: [illegible]  
26-2010

21 APR 1976

Honorable George Bush  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20501

Dear George:

A broad study of unauthorized disclosure of government secrets is going to be undertaken at my initiative. The study effort will be chaired by Adam Yarmolinsky. A panel of people outside of government will be constituted and focused on the problem. I am especially interested that the study give us some improved insight into the nature and sources of this problem. The terms of reference agreed with him are attached.

When the panel has been formed and the list of its other members is completed I will send it to you. Adam will want to talk to you in more detail about the objectives of the study and how it should proceed. You may want to follow the study as it proceeds since the problems being studied are, of course, of general concern.

Warm regards.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "RE", is written over the word "Sincerely".

Robert Ellsworth

ADAM YARMOLINSKY.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Unauthorized disclosure of government secrets appears to have increased significantly in the past decade. While some of this disclosure has been a reaction, direct or indirect, to official misconduct, and to misuse of secrecy, it has obscured general recognition of the public interest in keeping legitimate government secrets, and it has made the protection of those secrets substantially more difficult. The study group will address itself to the problem of securing better protection for those secrets, including not only intelligence data and methods, but military and diplomatic secrets as well.

The study group will examine the motivations for disclosure, and the conditions that make disclosure more (or less) probable; the impact of mistrust and alienation in popular attitudes toward government; the feasibility of better methods of selecting and training persons handling classified material; the effects of overclassification and delayed declassification; the tradeoffs between wider dissemination and better protection of secrets both within and outside the government; and the possibilities for reducing unnecessary dissemination of secrets within government.

The study group will recommend policies and procedures to deal with these problems.

Attempts by foreign powers or their agents to obtain government secrets are not within these terms of reference.

28 April 1976

The Honorable Robert F. Ellsworth  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Bob,

I have problems with the letter you sent me on 21 April. It seems to me that the whole question of unauthorized disclosure of government secrets and declassification really is the responsibility of the DCI under the Executive Order. If Mr. Yarmolinsky's study was to be restricted to Department of Defense matters, then I would not picture this as my area of concern.

Ed Proctor is already chairing a group of Intelligence Community officials who are developing principles and guidelines for classification and control of intelligence. Other efforts in this area are being undertaken by my NFIB Security Committee and the NSC.

I feel any Community-wide study panels of this nature should be appointed by the DCI.

Let's discuss this.

Sincerely,

George Bush  
Director

DCI/kgt/28 April 1976

**Distribution:**

Orig - Addressee

1 - DCI

4 - D/DCI/IC

1 - Mr. Knoche

1 - ER

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DCI/IC 76-004

27 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM : [redacted]  
Executive Assistant, ICSSUBJECT : Proposed DoD Study of Unauthorized  
Disclosure of Government SecretsREFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 26 April, same  
subject, SECOM-D-147

25X1 1. [redacted] requests that you or your Committee  
take the following actions to close the loop on this problem.

a. Prepare a paper on the Security Committee  
work regarding this subject; what are recommendations,  
what are the milestones on implementation, what problems  
are still unsolved, and what is the future course of  
Committee action.

25X1 b. [redacted] desires a similar paper, again  
answering the foregoing questions, on the work that  
Proctor's people are doing on this subject. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] feels that the papers need not be long; i.e., r<sup>25X1</sup>  
more than two pages each.

c. Please prepare a letter to Mr. Ellsworth in  
response to his 21 April letter to Mr. Bush. The  
letter should be pleasant but firm, and should include  
a concise statement on what we are doing with respect  
to secrecy and declassification.

25X1 2. [redacted] also desires that a talker be  
prepared for the DCI, should Mr. Bush decide to discuss this  
subject with General Scowcroft. Another talker should be  
prepared for discussion of this subject at the CFI.

Thanks,

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

ILLEGIB

**CONFIDENTIAL**



*J.C. King*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECOM-D-147  
26 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

25X1

FROM :   
Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT : Proposed DoD Study of Unauthorized Disclosure of Government Secrets

REFERENCE : Letter to the DCI from Mr. Ellsworth,  
Dated 21 April 1976

1. The broad Government-wide study proposed by Mr. Ellsworth would usurp some of the DCI's authority. The National Security Act of 1947 states:

"The DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Executive Order 11905 states:

"The DCI will ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures."

2. At the present time Dr. Edward Protter, DDI, is chairing a group of senior officials in the Intelligence Community, the purpose of which is to develop principles and guidelines for the classification and control of intelligence. The goal of his group is to protect those aspects of intelligence sources and methods that truly deserve protection and to allow broader access to intelligence by applying the lowest appropriate classification and minimum dissemination controls. This includes declassification and release to the public.

ILLEGIB

Unclassified when removed  
from Attachment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. The Intelligence Community has been greatly frustrated by unauthorized disclosures of classified information for many years. A working group of the Security Committee completed a study on unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. In its report dated 16 December 1975 (attached), nine recommendations were made. The Security Committee has not reached a final agreement on these recommendations.


4. The current DoD proposal appears to go beyond protection of sources and methods. Mr. Ellsworth indicates Yarmolinsky's group will cover not only intelligence data and methods, but military and diplomatic secrets as well. Such a broad-sweeping study by people outside of government of protection of government secrets should more appropriately be ordered by the National Security Council rather than by a department of the Executive Branch.

5. Such a study by people outside of government might prove valuable at this time. Numerous studies by the Intelligence Community have not led to a solution of this frustrating problem. Recommendation by an unbiased public group might find support in both the public sector and government circles.

RECOMMENDATION:

The DoD proposal goes beyond the DCI's responsibilities for protecting intelligence sources and methods. The establishment of such a non-government group to make a study encompassing "all government secrets" should more appropriately be tasked by the NSC. Cooperation by the government agencies concerned would be greater if such a study were undertaken at the request of the NSC rather than DoD.

25X1

  
Chairman, Security Committee

**Attachment**

Dist:  SECOM

0 - Adse w/att

① - IC Reg wo/att

1 - SECOM wo/att

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## IC REGISTRY ROUTING SLIP

4	B/DCI/IC		OPP		OPEI
5	EA		P&PD		INTEG STAFF
2	AD/DCI/IC		HUD		SIGINT DIV.
1	EO	11. 4/26	SECOM		IMAGERY DIV.
	SA	STAT	OPBD		HRD
	SA		DSG		PA&ID
	CFI/USIB		P&BDD		
2	REGISTRY		PAD		

Cy furn those circled

1-2  
STAT Mr. Bush gave a separate copy of this to  
[redacted] who in turn passed it to  
[redacted] for action. [redacted] is  
preparing response. STAT  
Suspend: 5 days.